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Abstract
We study Network Max-Congestion Games (NMC games, for short), a
class of network games where each player tries to minimize themost congested
edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity
of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that, for
single-commodity games with non-decreasing delay functions, this problem
is in P when either all the paths from the source to the target node are
disjoint or all the delay functions are equal. For the general case, we prove
that the computation of a PNE belongs to the complexity class PLS through a
new technique based on generalized ordinal potential functions and a slightly
modified definition of the usual local search neighborhood. We further apply
this technique to a different class of games (which we call Pareto-efficient)
with restricted cost functions. Finally, we also prove some PLS-hardness
results, showing that computing a PNE for Pareto-efficient NMC games is
indeed a PLS-complete problem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Game Theory
Broadly speaking, game theory is a branch of mathematics focused on the
modelling and study of situations where a number of entities or individuals
(usually called players) interact. Every player is supposed to have some
preferences with respect to his context (i.e. to the context modeled, be it
a market where a number of companies try to maximize their benefits or
an ecologic system where different species strive for survival) as well as a
certain degree of rationality (i.e. he is expected to act in accordance to his
preferences). Therefore, we can see as a game any situation where a set of
players modify their environment through their actions in order to adapt it
to their preferences. In non-cooperative games, which is the kind of games
on which we will focus our study, players are not required to cooperate, that
is they are selfish and respond only to their own interests. Often, it is also
assumed that they can not even communicate.
Given a number of players and assuming that the actions they may per-
form and their preferences are both known, the main objective of game theory
is to study the behaviour of the players, usually with the purpose to predict
the outcome of the game, that is, the state of the environment after the inter-
action of the players, if such a definitive state does exist. To be more precise:
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every player knows the actions that the other players are adopting, so he can
adapt his own actions to them. Thus, it is possible that the situation enters
a state of equilibrium where everyone is satisfied with his own acting, but it
could also happen that such a situation is never reached because the game
enters a dynamics where players keep acting and reacting endlessly. In this
state, it would be very interesting to be able to determine whether a given
game can enter one of this equilibrium situations, for instance, or this is not
possible. Naturally, it would be even more interesting to actually find the
equilibrium. This kind of issues are the ones that game theory deals with
and the ones that motivate this thesis.
We said that game theory is a branch of mathematics. To be more pre-
cise, we should say that it was born as such. It is generally accepted that
the study of game theory started in the forties with the publication of the
book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour by John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern. Initially, game theory developed as a tool of economic
analysis, but in the following years the applications of the theory to other
areas such as evolutive biology1 or philosophy of language2 began to be ex-
plored. Nowadays, game theory is applied also to a number of other subjects
related with human behaviour such as psychology, sociology, anthropology
or neurology. With respect to computer science, one simple example should
suffice to show one of the applications of game theory to it: the Internet.
Game theory is a perfect tool to model a large number of situations related
to the use and functioning of the Internet, given that this very large network
can be seen as a field where the (usually selfish) interests of a vast number
of entities converge: users of the network, ISP, large enterprises, etc. Thus,
game theory seems an adequate tool to study different aspects related to the
1See, for instance, the paper [Lewontin, 1961]. Quite interestingly, it is usually ac-
knowledged that the first (and probably unnoticed) application of game theory to the
field of evolutive biology dates back to the 19th century, when Darwin gave sort of a
game-theoretic justification of the fact that the natural proportion (i.e. the situation of
equilibrium) between the number of male and female subjects of any species was 1:1.
2See, for instance, [Lewis, 2002], first published in 1969
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behaviour of this entities on the Internet. Quoting professor Papadimitriou
[Papadimitriou, 2001],
The Internet has arguably surpassed the von Neumann computer
as the most complex computational artifact (if you can call it that)
of our time. Of all the formidable characteristics of the Internet
[...], I believe that the most novel and defining one is its socio-
economic complexity: The Internet is unique among all computer
systems in that it is built, operated, and used by a multitude of di-
verse economic interests, in varying relationships of collaboration
and competition with each other. This suggests that the mathe-
matical tools and insights most appropriate for understanding the
Internet may come from a fusion of algorithmic ideas with con-
cepts and techniques from Mathematical Economics and Game
Theory.
This thesis will be focused on an specific area of game theory, which we
shall try to describe informally now. As we mentioned before, we will study
non-cooperative games, that is, games where players do not have means to
cooperate among them – although a player seeking to satisfy his own interest
might indirectly benefit other players. There are plenty of different types of
non-cooperative games, but we will only consider a kind of games where
players compete for the use of a number of given resources, and the costs
they have to assume depends on how congested are the resources they use.
This genre of games are a first step towards the modelling of the Internet as
a game, since communication links can be understood as the resources for
which the users of the Internet compete, and it is rather natural to think
that their interest may be to use the least congested links available.
1.2 Aim of this Thesis
Generally speaking, this thesis is aimed at doing a theoretical research on
game theory, a field which is related to a number of other disciplines, being
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sort of a point where they all coincide (which is, in my opinion, one of the facts
that makes it such an appealing field). Therefore, it is one of the objectives of
this thesis to get introduced to the above-mentioned field, i.e. to understand
the significance and the technical details of the different models of games and
main theorems about them. After this first stage of the research has been
concluded, the second objective of the thesis will consist of actively trying to
prove new results about the new model of maximum congestion games.
1.3 Outline of the document
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a
general introduction to those aspects of game theory which are somehow re-
lated to this thesis, including a description of classical models of games such
as congestion games and a description of the model of maximum congestion
games upon which we will base our work. Chapters 3 and 4 contain the
results of our research. The first of them contains the results about existence
of pure Nash equilibria, whereas the second is focused on the complexity of
computing these equilibria. Chapter 5 summarizes our results and includes
a discussion about their originality and relevance. Finally, Appendix A con-
tains some additional information about the experiments made in Section 4.1.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we will introduce a number of concepts related to game theory
which we believe indispensable to the successful understanding of the rest of
the document. We will directly provide the formal definition of the different
concepts and game models involved in the thesis.
2.1 Game Theory
2.1.1 Strategic Games
The most general kind of game we will be dealing with here is the so-called
Strategic Game, which can be defined with the following elements: a set of
players, a set of actions for every player and some information about the
preferences of the players.
Definition 2.1.1. A Strategic game (or game, to abbreviate) can be formally
defined as a tuple Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N) where
• N is a set of n ≥ 2 players.
• For each player i ∈ N , Pi is a set of actions or strategies available
to him. In any given game, every player has to choose as strategy
one of the actions p ∈ Pi. Every element pi ∈ P1 × · · · × Pn, known
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as a pure strategy profile of the game, precisely describes a possible
outcome of the game, that is the strategy followed by all players in the
game. Given a profile pi = (p1, . . . , pn), it is understood that pi is the
strategy followed by the player i ∈ N . In addition, Π denotes the set
P1 × · · · × Pn of all the possible profiles for the game.
• ui : Π → R is the payoff function (or utility function) of each one of
the players i ∈ N . In any game Γ, ui(pi) is the payoff received by
player i ∈ N when the strategies of all the players are as described in
the strategy profile pi. Thus, this payoff does not depend solely on the
strategy adopted by the player, but also on the strategies of the other
players. This payoff function can also be seen as an indication of the
preferences of the player.
Pure and Mixed Profiles Sometimes it is useful to consider that players,
instead of deterministically choosing their strategy among all their available
actions, are able to randomize their choice. In that case, every player i ∈ N
can adopt as strategy a probability distribution over his action set Pi. Let
Ri denote the (infinite) set of all possible probability distributions over the
set of actions of player i
Ri =
{
r : Pi → [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
p∈Pi
r(p) = 1
}
Then, every element ρ ∈ R1 × · · · × Rn is known as a mixed strategy profile
and, for any given mixed profile ρ ∈ R1 × · · · × Rn, ri(p) is the probability
that player i chooses the action p ∈ Pi1. When using mixed profiles, we
usually consider expected payoffs. The expected payoff of any player i ∈ N
is then formally defined as
ui(ρ) =
∑
(p1,...,pn)∈Π
((
n∏
j=1
rj(pj)
)
· ui((p1, . . . , pn))
)
1Notice, however, that we will mainly study pure strategy profiles. Thus, unless ex-
plicitly stated, we will always be referring to pure profiles.
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Payoffs and Costs Although the functions ui have been traditionally in-
terpreted as utility functions, as we described above, it is also quite common
- especially in the research area of this document - to use the alternative
interpretation which considers them as cost functions - i.e. the players have
to assume a cost for the choices they make. In this case, a game is usually
denoted by a tuple Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N) where each function ci : Π→ R
is the cost function of player i ∈ N and ci(pi) is the cost assumed by player i
under the pure strategy profile pi. Naturally, players try to minimize the
cost of the strategy that they adopt. When mixed strategy profiles are al-
lowed, then the concept of expected cost is defined analogously to that of
expected payoff: the expected cost for player i ∈ N under the mixed profile
ρ = (r1, . . . , rn) is
ci(ρ) =
∑
(p1,...,pn)∈Π
((
n∏
j=1
rj(pj)
)
· ci((p1, . . . , pn))
)
This cost terminology is the one that we will use for the rest of this document.
A Simple Example One of the classical examples in game theory is the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is a game involving two players, two suspects of
having committed a crime. Each of them, being interrogated in isolation by
the police, is offered the same deal. He can either testify against the other
suspect or remain silent. The set of allowed actions is therefore equal for both
players, P1 = P2 = {Denounce (D), Silence (S)}. The deal goes like this: if
one suspect denounces the other but the other remains silent, then the first
one is freed and the second one receives a ten-year sentence (i.e. c1((D,S)) =
0 and c2((D,S)) = 10 and, conversely, c2((S,D)) = 0 and c1((S,D)) = 10).
If both suspects denounce the other, both are convicted for five years (i.e.
c1((D,D)) = c2((D,D)) = 5). Finally, if they both remain silent, then
both are convicted for only one year (i.e. c1((S, S)) = c2((S, S)) = 1).
Assuming that both suspects act rationally in defense of their own interests,
their choice should be clear. Both of them should reason that no matter what
the other suspect does, the best option is always to denounce him. Indeed,
9
2.1. Game Theory
if any of them thinks that the other one will denounce him, he would better
denounce too in order to get a five-year sentence instead of a ten-year one.
On the other hand, if he thinks that the other will remain silent, he would
better denounce him too, since this would allow him to go with no charges.
Therefore, the strategy profile (D,D) seems to be the natural outcome of
the game. However, it can be easily seen that from a global point of view
both suspects would be better off if they remained silent. This illustrates the
conflicts that usually arise between the interests of individuals and those of
the society.
2.1.2 Nash Equilibria
This notion of “natural outcome” that we have just seen in the previous
section is of great interest. One of the applications of game theory consists
of studying and predicting the future behaviour of any set of entities or
individuals competing in a common market. In the case of the Prisoner’s
dilemma, we have already seen that the strategy profile (D,D) is the one
that should arise as the predictable outcome of the interaction of the two
suspects. This profile can be thought of as a state of equilibrium, a stable
state in which no player of the game is willing to move, to change his strategy,
since any movement would damage his own interests. Notice that in the
Prisoner’s dilemma this profile (D,D) is the only one of the four possible
pure profiles (D,D), (D,S), (S,D), (S, S) which is an equilibrium.
This conceptualization of equilibrium has been known for years under
the name of Nash equilibrium in honour of the American mathematician
John F. Nash, and is arguably one of the most popular, at least in the area
of non-cooperative games. Before giving a formal definition, let us provide
some extra notation which is quite common in game theory. Given a tuple
pi = (p1, . . . , pn), it is usual to denote with (pi−i, p) (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n) the
tuple that we obtain if we substitute the i-th element of pi for the element p.
Therefore (pi−i, p) = (p1, . . . , pi−1, p, pi+1, . . . , pn).
Definition 2.1.2 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). Let Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N)
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be a strategic game. The pure strategy profile pi = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Π is said
to be a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE, for short) if no player is interested
in changing his strategy, that is, if no unilateral modification of his strategy
would decrease the cost that he is assuming. Formally,
∀i ∈ N ∀p ∈ Pi ci((pi−i, p)) ≥ ci(pi)
If the profile pi is a mixed strategy profile, we then have a Mixed Nash
Equilibrium. In this document, however, we will mainly study Pure equilib-
ria. Therefore, any mention to a Nash Equilibria will refer to a Pure Nash
Equilibria unless explicitly stated.
Observe that we have no guarantee that any of the pure strategy profiles
of a given game is a Nash equilibrium, nor we have any guarantee that there
is no more than one Nash equilibrium. This fact goes against the usefulness
of the concept of Nash Equilibria as a tool for predicting the behaviour of
the players of a given game, and is one of the most widely criticized points of
this concept: how can we predict the final equilibria situation of a market if
there are many pure Nash equilibria, how can we tell which of them is going
to be the one where the game ends up? However this criticism, to the present
date no one has been able to come up with a better notion of equilibrium.
2.1.3 Congestion Games
In his seminal paper [Rosenthal, 1973], Rosenthal describes a new class of
strategic games that have since then proved useful to model a wide array
of situations. All games of this class, called Congestion Games, share a
fundamental property: they all possess at least one Nash Equilibrium. The
proof of this property can be seen in Section 2.3, here we will formally describe
the class of games. Any congestion game is a strategic game with the special
feature that the n players of the game compete for the resources of a given
set of resources. Specifically, every player has to choose a subset of this set of
resources among a particular number of subsets. The cost that he will have
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to pay is given by the congestion of the resources he chooses, that is, by the
number of other players that choose the same resources as him.
Definition 2.1.3. An (unweighted) Congestion Game is defined as a tuple
Γ = (N,E, (Pi)i∈N , (de)e∈E) where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players.
• E is the set of resources, which is finite.
• Pi ⊆ P(E) is the set of allowed actions for every of the layers i ∈ N .
As it happened with general strategic games, each player i ∈ N chooses
as strategy one of the actions in Pi, and every element pi ∈ P1×· · ·×Pn
is a pure strategy profile of Γ that describes the strategy followed by
all players. Now, for any resource e ∈ E, Λe(pi) denotes the set of users
of e under the profile pi = (p1, . . . , pn), that is, the set of players for
which this resource is part of their strategy: Λe(pi) = {i ∈ N | e ∈ pi}.
We finally say that the congestion le(pi) of the resource e under pi is the
number of users of e under pi, le(pi) = |Λe(pi)|.
• de : N → R is the delay function of each resource e ∈ E, which we as-
sume to be polynomial-time computable. This function models the de-
lay de(k) provoked by the resource e under a congestion k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(in other words, the cost of using this particular resource under a given
congestion). The cost assumed by each player is then defined as the
sum of costs induced by each of the resources he uses. That is, the cost
function ci : Π → R of every player i ∈ N under the strategy profile
pi = (p1, . . . , pn) is
ci(pi) =
∑
e∈pi
de(le(pi))
Weighted Congestion Games Sometimes it is useful to model situations
where the different players have a different degree of influence on the con-
gestion of the resources they use. In other words, the players can be seen as
12
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having an associated weight or demand that determines the extent to which
they congest the resources. This requires a small modification of the defini-
tion that we have already given, but has important consequences, as we will
see in section 2.3. The games of this new kind are commonly called weighted
congestion games, so we will call the games of the previous kind unweighted
congestion games (or, simply, congestion games, given that the original defi-
nition does not consider weights). In his paper [Milchtaich, 1996], Milchtaich
defines this kind of games as follows.
Definition 2.1.4. A weighted congestion game is defined as a tuple Γ =
(N,E, (Pi)i∈N , (de)e∈E, (wi)i∈N). The set of players N , the set of resources
E, the sets Pi of available actions, the delay functions de as well as the
concepts of strategy profile and set of users of a resource are defined in the
same manner as in unweighted congestion games (see definition 2.1.3). In
contrast, now every player i ∈ N has a positive integer weight wi ∈ N+ that
influences the congestion of the resources used by player i as follows. The
congestion of resource e ∈ E is now the sum of the weights of its users
le(pi) =
∑
i∈Λe(pi)
wi
Finally, the cost function ci : Π → R associated to every player i has the
same definition as before:
ci((p1, . . . , pn)) =
∑
e∈pi
de(le((p1, . . . , pn)))
It is immediate to see that the class of weighted games is a generalisation
of the class of unweighted games, given that every unweighted game can be
seen as a weighted game where all players have weight one. Furthermore,
both weighted and unweighted games are clearly a specific kind of strategic
games.
2.1.4 Network Congestion Games
In some cases it can be useful to consider more succinct computational rep-
resentations of a congestion game, given that the naive representation would
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require, in addition of the listing of all resources, that all available subsets
of resources to each players be also listed, and that could potentially re-
quire an amount of space exponentially larger with respect to the number
of resources. One of the most used implicit representations of the subsets
of resources available to each player is given by means of the structure of a
graph in the so-called network congestion games. In a game of this kind, the
set of resources is considered to be the set of edges of a given graph, whereas
the set of available actions of any player consists of the set of paths in the
graph between two particular nodes.
Definition 2.1.5. A network congestion game is defined as a tuple Γ =
(N,G, ((si, ti))i∈N , (de)e∈E(G)), where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players.
• G = (V,E) is a directed graph.
• (si, ti) ∈ V × V is the pair of origin and destination nodes (or source
and target nodes) of every player i ∈ N .
• de : N→ R is the delay function of every edge e ∈ E, which we assume
to be polynomial-time computable.
As we said before, the set Pi of actions available to each player i is
now defined implicitly by this pair of nodes as the set of all (si − ti)
paths2. This set is finite, since we do not consider paths containing
repeated edges. We will sometimes use P to denote the union of the
sets of actions of all players, P =
⋃
i∈N Pi. The definition of the rest of
elements of the game is the same that we gave in the previous section
for general congestion games.
Weighted NCGs The extension of network congestion games to allow
players to have different weights is completely identical to that of general
2We will use the shorthand (s− t) path to refer to a path between the nodes s and t.
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congestion games. We therefore refer the reader to section 2.1.3 for details,
and we will just give here a formal definition.
Definition 2.1.6. A weighted network congestion game is defined as a tu-
ple Γ = (N,G, ((si, ti))i∈N , (de)e∈E(G), (wi)i∈N). The set of players N , the
directed graph G, the pair of origin and destination nodes (si, ti) of each
player, the set Pi of actions available to him, the delay function de of each
edge in G and the cost function ci : Π → R associated to every player i are
defined as in the model of unweighted congestion games (see definition 2.1.5).
On the other hand, now every player has a positive integer weight wi ∈ N+,
and the congestion of any edge e ∈ E is defined as
le(pi) =
∑
i∈Λe(pi)
wi
Again, all unweighted NCG can be seen as a weighted NCG where all
players have weight one, and they can be easily seen to be subclasses of
unweighted CG and weighted CG, respectively.
Single-commodity Games If the all the origin nodes of all players in a
NCG Γ are the same node, and so are all the destination nodes, then Γ is
said to be a single-commodity game. If that does not happen, Γ is said to
be a multi-commodity game. Notice that for single-commodity games, all
players share the same set of actions Pi = P . For the sake of simplicity, we
will refer to single-commodity games as tuples
Γ = (N,G, (s, t), (de)e∈E(G))
Analogously, we will refer to weighted single-commodity network congestion
games as tuples
Γ = (N,G, (s, t), (de)e∈E(G), (wi)i∈N)
.
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2.1.5 Network Maximum Congestion Games
We will now describe the game model which we plan to carry on our research
on. It is a class of strategic game which highly resembles the class of net-
work congestion games that we have just described, since all players have to
choose a path in a graph and the cost assumed by them is still based on the
congestion of the edges of the path they choose. In the games of this new
model, which we call network maximum congestion games (or network max-
congestion games, NMC games, for short), the exact cost is not given by the
sum of the congestion of the edges, but instead by the maximum congestion
among them.
Before we go into a formal definition, let us give a brief justification for
the study of this model. Consider the next situation: we have a number of
users of a communication network, each of them sending packets between
different network endpoints. It may happen that the users want to route
their information through a path with maximum bandwidth, that is, a path
such that the congestion of the most congested link is minimized. In this
case, the traditional model of congestion games is not useful anymore to
study the needs and behaviour of the users. However, we believe that the
model that we present here is a first and interesting step towards being able
to successfully analyse situations like this one3.
Let us now give a more formal definition of this new class of games.
Definition 2.1.7. A network max-congestion game is defined by a tuple
Γ = (N,G, ((si, ti))i∈N , (de)e∈E(G)) where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players.
• G = (V,E) is a directed graph.
• (si, ti) ∈ V × V is the pair of origin and destination nodes (or source
and target nodes) of every player i ∈ N .
3Other examples from the telecommunications field which justify the study of our model
can be found in [Banner and Orda, 2006].
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• de : N→ R is the delay function of every edge e ∈ E, which we assume
to be polynomial-time computable.
The definition of the different elements of the game mirrors that of the
network congestion games model (see definition 2.1.5). The set Pi of actions
available for player i is the set of (si − ti) paths in the graph G. Every pure
strategy profile, thus, is an element pi in the set P1 × · · · × Pn. For every
edge e ∈ E, Λe(pi) = {i ∈ N | e ∈ pi} is the set of users of e in the profile pi.
The congestion le(pi) of the edge e in the strategy profile pi is again defined
as the number of players of the game that use e in the strategy that they play
in pi, le(pi) = |Λe(pi)|. Finally, and this is where the novelty of this model
lies, the cost assumed by each player i ∈ N in the profile pi = (p1, . . . , pn) is
now defined as the maximum delay of the edges of its path:
ci(pi) = max
e∈pi
de(le(pi))
Weighted Network Max-Congestion Games As it happened with con-
gestion games, we will also consider NMC games where players are allowed
to have different weights.
Definition 2.1.8. A weighted network max-congestion game is defined as a
tuple Γ = (N,G, ((si, ti))i∈N , (wi)i∈N , (de)e∈E(G)). The set N of players, the
directed graph G, the origin and destination nodes (si, ti) and the delay func-
tions de are defined as we did with unweighted games (see definition 2.1.7),
and so are the set Pi of actions available to every player, the set Λe of users
of every edge e and the cost function ci : Π→ R associated to every player i.
However, every player i now has a positive integer weight wi ∈ N+, and the
congestion of any edge e ∈ E is defined as
le(pi) =
∑
i∈Λe(pi)
wi
Single-commodity Games The definition of single-commodity NMC games
is also analogous to the one that we gave for congestion games (see the
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previous section). A (possibly weighted) NMC game is said to be single-
commodity if all players share the same endpoints (si, ti); if that is not the
case, it is said to be multi-commodity. Therefore, we will denote unweighted
and weighted single-commodity games with tuples Γ = (N,G, (s, t), (de)e∈E(G))
and Γ = (N,G, (s, t), (wi)i∈N , (de)e∈E(G)), respectively.
2.1.6 Potential Functions and Games
Potential functions were systematically studied for the first time in [Monderer
and Shapley, 1996] as a mechanism to establish certain properties of strategic
games, most notably the existence of pure Nash equilibria, as we will see in
Section 2.3. Let us here give some definitions related to this technique. The
main idea is to find a global measure of potential that decreases only along
with any decrease of the cost assumed by any player, but there are different
kinds of potential function that follow this idea in different grades.
Definition 2.1.9. The function φ : Π → R is said to be an exact potential
for a strategic game Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N) if for every pi ∈ Π, i ∈ N ,
p ∈ Pi, it holds that ci(pi−i, p)− ci(pi) = φ(pi−i, p)−φ(pi). Any strategic game
possessing an exact potential function is called an exact potential game.
Definition 2.1.10. The function φ : Π→ R is said to be an ordinal potential
for a strategic game Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N) if for every pi ∈ Π, i ∈ N ,
p ∈ Pi, it holds that ci(pi−i, p) < ci(pi) ⇔ φ(pi−i, p) < φ(pi). Any strategic
game possessing an ordinal potential function is called an ordinal potential
game.
Definition 2.1.11. The function φ : Π → R is said to be a generalized
ordinal potential for a strategic game Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N) if for every
pi ∈ Π, i ∈ N , p ∈ Pi, it holds that ci(pi−i, p) < ci(pi) ⇒ φ(pi−i, p) <
φ(pi). Any strategic game possessing an ordinal potential function is called a
generalized ordinal potential game.
Notice that every exact potential game is an ordinal potential game and
every ordinal potential game is a generalized ordinal potential game.
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2.1.7 Pareto-efficient games.
We will here briefly describe a simple class of games whose definition arises
from what in economics is known as Pareto improvement (a concept named
after V. Pareto, an Italian economist). A Pareto improvement is performed
when a player changes his strategy to reduce the cost he is paying while, at
the same time, the cost of no other player is increased by this change.
Definition 2.1.12. We say that a strategic game is Pareto-efficient if the
cost functions of the game are defined in such a way that all the improving
movements that a player may do provoke no harm to the other players, that
is, if for any profile pi, player i and strategy p ∈ Pi, it holds that
ci(pi−i, p) < ci(pi)⇒ ∀j ∈ N cj(pi−i, p) ≤ cj(pi)
2.2 Computational Complexity
We will here give some computational complexity definitions which are re-
lated to our thesis; specifically to the study of the complexity of finding Nash
equilibria for certain classes of games, as we will point out in the next sec-
tion. Before we give a formal definition, we shall discuss a little bit about
functional extensions of the basic complexity classes P and NP.
2.2.1 Search Problems, FP and FNP
When dealing with computational problems, sometimes we do not only want
to know if an object with some desired properties exists (e.g. if there exists
any truth assignment that satisfies a given Boolean formula), but to obtain
one of the objects with such properties, if any of them exists at all (e.g. we
want to obtain one of the satisfying assignments). This kind of problems
are usually called search problems (see [Johnson, 2007] for a good discussion
about them). The class FNP of search problems (which stands for Functional
NP; see, for instance, [Megiddo and Papadimitriou, 1991]) is the analogous
version of the decision problems complexity class NP.
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Definition 2.2.1. A FNP search problem Π consists of
i) A polynomial-time recognizable set of instances IΠ.
ii) A polynomial-time recognizable relation
RΠ = {(x, y) | x ∈ IΠ ∧ |y| ≤ p(|x|)}
where p is a polynomial. The goal of the problem is, given any instance
x ∈ IΠ, to find a y such that (x, y) ∈ RΠ.
We will also consider the class of problems TFNP (for Total Functional NP)
for which the existence of the object that we are looking for is guaranteed.
Definition 2.2.2. A search problem Π is in TFNP if it is in FNP and for each
x ∈ IΠ there is at least one y such that (x, y) ∈ RΠ.
Finally, let us give the definition of the class FP (for Functional P) for the
sake of completeness:
Definition 2.2.3. A search problem Π is in FP if it is in TFNP and there
exists a polynomial-time algorithm such that for any x ∈ IΠ outputs a y such
that (x, y) ∈ RΠ.
We clearly have that FP ⊆ TFNP ⊆ FNP, but it is currently unknown
whether any of the inclusions is strict or not.
Now, a combinatorial optimization problem is a search problem where
we do not only want to find an object with a given set of properties, but we
want to find the object with these properties that optimizes a given function.
Formally, we say that a combinatorial optimization problem Π is defined as a
tuple (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ), where (IΠ, RΠ) is a search problem and cΠ is an associated
cost function. For ease (and slightly abusing of the notation) let us denote
by RΠ(x) the (possibly empty) set of solutions of the instance x ∈ IΠ, that
is, the set
RΠ(x) = {y | (x, y) ∈ RΠ}
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Then, we say that any solution y ∈ RΠ(x) of a given instance x ∈ IΠ has a
cost cΠ(x, y). As we said, given any instance x of a combinatorial problem Π,
we want to find a solution y ∈ RΠ(x) that globally minimizes (or maximizes,
depending on what kind of optimization we are dealing with) the function
cΠ, i.e., a solution such that cΠ(x, y) is an optimum value. Consider, as
an illustration, the MAX-SAT problem. The set of instances IMAX-SAT of
the problem contains all possible accepted encodings of a weighted boolean
formula in conjunctive normal form, that is, a formula where all the clauses
have an associated weight. For any given weighted formula x ∈ IMAX-SAT, the
set of feasible solutions RMAX-SAT(x) contains all possible truth assignments
for formula x. Finally, the cost cMAX-SAT(x, y) of a solution y ∈ RMAX-SAT(x)
is the sum of the weights of the clauses of x that are satisfied by the truth
assignment y.
Observe that any combinatorial optimization problem Π = (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ)
can be seen as a simple search problem just by adding the condition of local
optimality to the properties of the object that we want to find. That is,
the combinatorial optimization problem Π = (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ) is equivalent to the
search problem Π′ = (IΠ′ , RΠ′), where IΠ′ = IΠ and
RΠ′ = {(x, y) | x ∈ IΠ ∧ y ∈ RΠ(x) ∧ ∀ z ∈ RΠ(x) cΠ(x, z) ≥ cΠ(x, y)}
(in the case of a minimization problem). This allows us to be able to classify
optimization problems into the classes FNP, TFNP and FP that we defined
above.
There is a large number of combinatorial optimization problems for which
there is no known polynomial-time algorithm able to solve them. In some
cases, the algorithmic technique of local search [Aarts and Lenstra, 2003] has
been proved useful for finding good (but not always globally optimal) solu-
tions for this problems. The idea is to conduct a search guided by a neighbor-
hood structure that, in some sense, relates good solutions to similar solutions
that may possibly be as good, or even better. Formally, a local search prob-
lem is defined as a tuple Π = (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ, NΠ) which is the conjunction of a
combinatorial optimization problem (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ) with a neighborhood struc-
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ture NΠ which relates solutions of the problem to other solutions. Thus,
any solution y ∈ RΠ(x) has a (possibly empty) set of neighboring solutions
NΠ(x, y) ⊆ RΠ(x). Given a pair (Π, NΠ), the local search problem is to find a
solution y ∈ RΠ(x) which is a local optimum, i.e. such that all his neighbors
do not have a strictly lower cost (for the case of minimization problems). To
follow with our previous example, a common neighborhood structure used
to tackle the MAX-SAT problem with a local search algorithm is known
as the flip algorithm, for it relates any given truth assignation to all other
assignations where only a variable has a different truth value.
Note that again any local search problem Π = (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ, NΠ) can be
seen as a simple search problem Π′ = (IΠ′ , RΠ′) where IΠ′ = IΠ and
RΠ′ = {(x, y) | x ∈ IΠ ∧ y ∈ RΠ(x) ∧ ∀ z ∈ NΠ(x, y) cΠ(x, z) ≥ cΠ(x, y)}
2.2.2 The Class PLS
The class PLS (for Polynomial-time Local Search), first introduced in [John-
son et al., 1988; Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991], captures the complexity
of those local search problems where a move from one solution to a better
solution in the neighborhood requires only polynomial time.
Definition 2.2.4. A local search problem Π = (IΠ, RΠ, cΠ, NΠ) belongs to
the complexity class PLS if there exist the following three polynomial-time
algorithms:
• A polynomial-time algorithm AΠ that, for any string x is able to de-
termine if x ∈ IΠ and, if that is the case, to produce a feasible initial
solution y ∈ RΠ(x).
• A polynomial-time algorithm CΠ that, for any instance x ∈ IΠ and any
string y decides if y is a feasible solution for x (i.e. if (x, y) ∈ RΠ)
and, if that is the case, computes the cost of the solution cΠ(x, y).
• A polynomial-time algorithm FΠ that, given a pair (x, y) ∈ RΠ de-
termines if the solution y is locally optimal with respect to the neigh-
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borhood NΠ and, if not, returns a solution z ∈ NΠ(x, y) such that
cΠ(z, y) < cΠ(x, y) (for a minimization problem).
Any PLS problem can be seen to belong the class FNP. In addition, since,
by definition, any instance of a PLS problem is guaranteed to have at least
one feasible solution (the initial one), and assuming finiteness of the search
space, any instance of the problem will have at least one local optimum.
Thus, we have that PLS ⊆ TFNP. On the other hand, any search problem Π
in FP can be formulated as a PLS problem (see [Johnson et al., 1988] for the
details. Thus, we have that
FP ⊆ PLS ⊆ TFNP
2.2.3 PLS-reductions
It is useful to define a suitable notion of reduction among search problems
in order to identify problems that are complete, that is, problems that are
the most difficult among those of their class. We will directly give the formal
definition of the kind of reductions which are usually used to relate PLS
problems, which are known as PLS-reductions.
Definition 2.2.5. A local search problem Π1 is PLS-reducible to another local
search problem Π2 if there exist the following two polynomial-time computable
functions:
i) A function f : IΠ1 → IΠ2 that maps every instance of the first problem
to an instance of the second problem.
ii) A function g : {(x, y) | x ∈ IΠ1 ∧ y ∈ RΠ2(f(x))} → RΠ1(x) such that
for all instances x ∈ Π1 we have that if y is a local optimum for the
instance f(x), then g(x, y) is a local optimum for x.
Intuitively, the function f maps instances x of the problem Π1 to instances
f(x) of the problem Π2. Once we have found a solution y ∈ RΠ2(f(x)) for the
instance f(x) of Π2, the function g maps this solution “back” to a solution
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of the first instance x. The only requirement that we place on this process
of mapping and remapping back is that if we find a local optimum for the
instance of Π2, then the instance of Π1 that we get when we map the local
optimum back must also be a local optimum.
With this definition of a PLS-reduction, we now can define the usual
notion of completeness:
Definition 2.2.6. A local search problem Π is PLS-complete if
i) Π belongs to PLS
ii) Any other problem in PLS can be reduced to Π through a PLS-reduction.
The first problem which was identified as PLS-complete (through a con-
struction analogous to the NP generic reduction to CIRCUIT-SAT, see [John-
son et al., 1988]) was the CIRCUIT-FLIP problem, defined as follows. The
set of instances contains all possible acyclic boolean circuits with and, or and
not gates, while the feasible solutions are all those possible binary inputs (i.e.
binary strings) to the circuit. The cost of any solution x is then the output
of the circuit (seen as a binary number) when the input x is applied to the
circuit. For any given solution x, the set of its neighbors contains all those
binary strings obtained by flipping a single bit of the string x.
Since then, other interesting problems such as the WEIGHTED MAX-
CUT with a flip neighborhood [Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991] structure
or the TSP with the Lin-Kernighan neighborhood structure [Papadimitriou,
1992] have been shown to belong to the class PLS.
2.3 Relevant Results
In this section we will describe some relevant results of game theory which
are related to this thesis.
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2.3.1 Existence of Nash equilibria
We will first present those results which refer to the existence of Nash equilib-
ria for the games of the classes that we described above. As we mentioned,
the potential nonexistence of pure Nash equilibria has often been signaled
as one of the weak points of the concept of Nash equilibrium itself, since it
places a limit on the usefulness of the concept as a tool of prediction. The
next theorem, proved by Nash some fifty years ago in his famous paper [Nash,
1950], shows that if we allow the players to play mixed strategy profiles, then
the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium is guaranteed for any strategic
game.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Nash, 1950). Every strategic game has at least one mixed
Nash equilibrium profile.
If we want to be able to make such as a strong statement with pure
profiles, however, we need to consider restricted classes of games. This is the
case of congestion games
Theorem 2.3.2 (Rosenthal, 1973). Every unweighted congestion game has
at least one pure Nash equilibrium profile.
R.W. Rosenthal was the first to prove this interesting property in his pa-
per [Rosenthal, 1973]. His proof essentially formulated the problem of finding
a PNE in a congestion game as a binary integer programming optimization
problem whose solution was a PNE for the game. Given that all binary
integer programming problem can be solved (even though not always effi-
ciently), all congestion game must have a PNE. From another point of view,
what Rosenthal did was to provide an exact potential function and (implic-
itly) base his proof on the following theorem by Monderer and Shapley:
Theorem 2.3.3 (Rosenthal, 1973). Every unweighted congestion game has
an exact potential function.
Theorem 2.3.4 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Any strategic game possess-
ing a generalized ordinal potential function has at least one PNE profile.
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Proof. This simple proof is implicit in [Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. Let φ
be an ordinal potential function for the strategic game Γ. Since the strategy
space Π of the game is finite, there must exist at least one strategy profile
pi∗ that minimizes φ. This profile, by the definition of a generalized ordinal
potential function, is a PNE.
The next important theorem further clarifies the relation between exact
potential games and congestion games, essentially stating that (up to iso-
morphism) they are the same class of games.
Theorem 2.3.5 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Every (finite) exact poten-
tial game is isomorphic to an unweighted congestion game.
However, if we switch to games with weights things change quite sig-
nificantly. On one hand, not all weighted congestion games have an exact
potential function, in contrast with Theorem 2.3.3:
Theorem 2.3.6 (Fotakis et al., 2005). There exist weighted CG (even with
identity delay functions) which possess no exact potential function.
On the other hand, not only weighted games are not guaranteed to possess
exact potential functions, but they are neither guaranteed to possess PNE
profiles. Even for the most restricted class of weighted games, i.e. weighted
single-commodity network congestion games, it is known that some games
may not have pure Nash equilibria:
Theorem 2.3.7 (Fotakis et al., 2005). There are weighted single-commodity
network congestion games which have no PNE profile.
In fact, deciding if a given weighted network congestion game with non-
decreasing delay functions possesses a PNE is a hard problem:
Theorem 2.3.8 (Dunkel and Schulz, 2006). The problem of determining if a
given weighted network congestion game with non-decreasing delay functions
has any PNE profile is strongly NP-complete for single-commodity instances
as well as for multi-commodity instances when the number of players is fixed.
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The proof of Theorem 2.3.7 is through a game with piecewise delay func-
tions. If we put an additional restriction, however, and consider only those
games with linear delay functions, this is not true anymore, even for multi-
commodity games:
Theorem 2.3.9 (Fotakis et al., 2006). Every weighted multi-commodity net-
work congestion game with linear delay functions has at least one PNE profile.
2.3.2 Complexity of Nash Equilibria Computation.
The proofs of the two main above theorems about PNE existence (Nash,
Rosenthal) are both non-constructive. Thus, they leave unresolved an issue
of remarkable importance from the point of view of the computer science:
what is the computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium? Is
it a task which can be solved efficiently? For the class of general strategic
games, this questions were recently answered in a series of papers which were
published in a short period of time, each of them extending the results of
the previous one. Daskalakis, Papadimitriou and Goldberg started the series
proving the next theorem in October 2005:
Theorem 2.3.10 (Daskalakis et al., 2005). The problem of computing a
(possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium for a given strategic game with at least
four players is PPAD-complete4.
One month later, Chen and Deng, in parallel with Daskalakis and Pa-
padimitriou, proved that the theorem also holds for games with three players.
4The complexity class PPAD (for Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) was
originally described in [Papadimitriou, 1994], and is another subclass of the TFNP class,
which we described in Section 2.2. As it happens with the class PLS, the other subclass of
TFNP that we have seen, we have that
FP ⊆ PPAD ⊆ TFNP
Note, in addition, that the relation between the classes PPAD and PLS is currently not
known.
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Theorem 2.3.11 (Chen and Deng, 2005b; Daskalakis and Papadimitriou,
2005). The problem of computing a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium for a
given strategic game with at least three players is PPAD-complete.
Finally, one month later, in December 2005, Chen and Deng resolved
complexity of the problem for two-player games.
Theorem 2.3.12 (Chen and Deng, 2005a). The problem of computing a
(possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium for any given strategic game is PPAD-
complete.
On the other hand, if we consider the class of unweighted congestion
games (for which the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed, as we
stated before), the complexity of finding a PNE was settled by Fabrikant,
Papadimitriou and Talwar in a 2004 article.
Theorem 2.3.13 (Fabrikant et al., 2004). The problem of computing a pure
Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete for the following classes of games:
i) Unweighted congestion games.
ii) Symmetric unweighted congestion games.
iii) Unweighted multi-commodity network congestion games.
However, if we consider only unweighted single-commodity network con-
gestion games, then the computation of a PNE can be done efficiently, as the
same authors prove through a reduction to the min-flow problem.
Theorem 2.3.14 (Fabrikant et al., 2004). The computation of a PNE for
unweighted single-commodity network congestion games can be done in poly-
nomial time.
If we allow players to have weights, we have that in network congestion
games with linear delay functions (for which the existence of a PNE is as-
sured, see Theorem 2.3.9), the computation of a PNE can be carried out in
pseudo-polynomial time.
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Single-com. Multi-com.
Unweight. FP PLS-complete
Weight.
stepwise delay functions: a PNE May not exist
linear delay functions: pseudopolynomial time
Figure 2.1: Existence and complexity of computing a PNE in network con-
gestion games. If not stated otherwise, the games have non-decreasing delay
functions.
Theorem 2.3.15 (Fotakis et al., 2005). The computation of a PNE for
weighted multi-commodity network congestion games with linear delay func-
tions can be carried out in pseudo-polynomial time.
We have outlined the main results about existence and computability of
PNE in network congestion games in Table 2.1. As it can be seen in the
whole section, three are the components of the game which play a major role
in this kind of results: the game being weighted or unweighted, the game
being single or multi-commodity and, finally, the kind of delay function of
the game.
2.3.3 Results on Max-congestion Games
As we said on the introduction, there are some papers which we have dis-
covered during the development of this thesis that also present some results
for the model of max-congestion games. We will here just mention the three
papers that we are referring to, and we will leave a detailed comparison of
the results for the conclusions chapter, once we have presented our results.
The three papers are
i) [Caragiannis et al., 2005], presented at the International Symposium
on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC) of December 2005.
ii) [Busch and Magdon-Ismail, 2006], presented at the International Sym-
posium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS) of Febru-
ary 2006.
29
2.3. Relevant Results
iii) [Banner and Orda, 2006], presented at the INFOCOM conference of
April 2006.
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Chapter 3
Existence of Pure Nash
Equilibria
In this first chapter or results we study the existence of pure Nash equilib-
rium profiles for different kinds of NMC games. Specifically, we will see how
changes in the restrictions we place upon the main components of the game
–i.e. weights, delay functions, graph topology (single- / multi-commodity
games)– affect the existence of PNE.
Allowing all kind of delay functions, we can see that even some (weighted)
single-commodity games have no PNE profile. Consider, as an example, a
simple NMC game with only two parallel links, two players with weights
w1 = 1 and w2 = 2 and delay functions as defined in Fig. 3.1. It can be seen
(a quick check suffices, since there are only four possible strategy profiles)
that no matter what strategies the players choose, at least one of them will
always have a better alternative. If both choose the first link, player two has
d1(w) =

4, if w = 1
1, if w = 2
4, if w = 3
d2(w) =

5, if w = 1
3, if w = 2
2, if w = 3
Figure 3.1: Delay Functions of a NMC game with no PNE profiles.
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an incentive to move to the second one (where his cost would be 3 instead
of 4). If both choose the second link, player two again has an incentive to
change, since moving to link 1 would report him a cost of 1 instead of two.
If player one goes to the first link and player two to the second one, player
one will likely want to move to the second link, where he would have to pay
a cost of 2 units instead of 4. Finally, if player one chooses the second link
and player two chooses the first one, player one will find out that a move to
the first link would decrease the cost he is paying from 5 to 4. Actually, it is
interesting to see that the problem of determining whether a given game of
this class has any PNE is, NP-complete, as we show in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.0.1. The problem of deciding if a weighted single-commodity
NMC game with arbitrary delay functions has a PNE profile is NP-complete.
Proof. The membership in NP is quite straightforward. On one hand, every
strategy profile has size polynomial with respect to the size of the game, since
it contains one path for each player (and, since the game is weighted, the
representation of the input game contains at least one bit per player). On
the other hand, checking if a given strategy profile is a PNE is a task that
can be done in polynomial time: for each of the players, we just check if there
is a (s− t) path with lower cost. This can be done by fixing the strategies of
all other players and applying a shortest-path-like algorithm to the graph.
With respect to the hardness, the proof is based on a reduction from the
satisfiability problem. Starting with a boolean formula F with n different
boolean variables x1, x2, . . . , xn, the reduction is as follows. There are n+ 2
players p1, . . . , pn, pn+1, pn+2, each of them having a weight of n+2 bits which
uniquely identifies the player (e.g. with all bits but the i-th set to 0). Note
that in this manner the definition of the delay functions of any edge can be
dependant on the specific players that are using the edge (in other words, the
value of the delay of an edge can depend upon if a given player is using that
edge). The graph of the game consists only on three parallel links e, eT and
eF , with respective delay functions d, dT and dF defined in Fig. 3.2. Here,
M is a very large integer, and σF and σT are boolean assignments defined as
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d(w) =
2, if only pn+2 uses eM , otherwise dF (w) =
0, if σF (F )4, otherwise
dT (w) =

0, if σT (F )
3, if ¬σT (F ) ∧ pn+1 and pn+2 use eT
5, if ¬σT (F ) ∧ pn+1 uses eT ∧ pn+2 does not
1, if ¬σT (F ) ∧ pn+2 uses eT ∧ pn+1 does not
Figure 3.2: Delay Functions for the game of Theorem 3.0.1
follows:
σF (xi) = False ⇔ player pi uses edge eF
σT (xi) = True ⇔ player pi uses edge eT
Now, suppose that F is satisfied by at least one assignment σ∗, and let
pi∗ be a strategy profile such that every player pi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n) uses edge
eT if σ
∗(xi) is true and uses edge eF otherwise. Both boolean assignments
σT and σF are thus equivalent to σ
∗, so (as long as players pn+1 and pn+2
choose either edge eT or edge eF ) all players have to assume a cost of 0, which
implies that pi∗ is a PNE.
On the other hand, suppose that F is unsatisfiable, and let pi be any
strategy profile. Since the formula is unsatisfiable, both boolean assignments
σT and σF are always such that σT (F ) = σF (F ) = False. In this situation,
no matter what the other players choose, it can be seen (e.g. by examining
the 9 different possibilities) that either player pn+1 or player pn+2 always have
an incentive to change their strategy.
Now, it would be interesting to consider a very natural restriction on
the delay functions of the games, namely that they be non-decreasing. If
we examine first unweighted games, we have to note that, unlike what hap-
pens with (traditional) unweighted congestion games, not all unweighted
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non-decreasing delay NMC games have an exact potential function:
Lemma 3.0.2 (Caragiannis et al., 2005). There exist unweighted non-decreasing
delay NMC games which possess no exact potential function.
Therefore, the existence of PNE profiles cannot be proved directly by
means of the usual potential function technique, as Rosenthal did. In early
stages of our research, we managed to independently prove the existence of
these PNE profiles by means of constructive proof, but our algorithm did
only work for certain subclasses of unweighted non-decreasing delay NMC
games. Further research led us to discover that a more general proof can
be obtained which is actually made up of two results of previous papers,
[Monderer and Shapley, 1996] and [Banner and Orda, 2006]. Indeed, even
though the games of this class can not always be shown to have an exact
potential function, even for weighted NMC games we can show that there
always exist a generalized ordinal potential function. This implies, as we
have seen in Theorem 2.3.4, that they possess at least one PNE profile.
Let us carefully go through the proof of this statement. First Let Γ =
(N,G, ((si, ti))i∈N , (de)e∈E(G), (wi)i∈N) be a weighted network max-congestion
game. For any possible strategy profile pi of the game, let A(pi) be a tuple
A(pi) = (ci1(pi), ci2(pi), . . . , cin(pi)) such that ci1(pi) ≥ ci2(pi) ≥ · · · ≥ cin(pi)
are the costs assumed by the players ordered in non-increasing order. Let
<l: Nn → Nn be the usual (total) lexicographical order defined over all
possible pairs of tuples A(pi), A(pi′). Now, consider two possible strategy
profiles pi and pi′ such that only one player has changed his strategy between
them, i.e. such that pi = (pi−i, p) and pi′ = (pi−i, p′) for some strategies p 6= p′
of player i.
Claim 3.0.3 (Banner and Orda, 2006, Theorem 3).
ci(pi
′) < ci(pi)⇒ A(pi′) <l A(pi)
Proof. The proof of the statement is an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 3
of in [Banner and Orda, 2006] which can be directly generalized to the case
of arbitrary non-decreasing delay functions.
34
Recall that player all players but player i have the same strategy both in
pi and pi′. Thus, between pi and pi′ only player i changes his strategy, and by
doing this he obtains a lower cost. Assume that the value of the cost payed
by player i in pi is the j-th element of the vector A(pi), i.e.
A(pi) = (ci1(pi), ci2(pi), . . . , cij−1(pi), ci(pi), cij+1(pi), . . . , cin(pi))
Assume also that the firstm elements of A(pi) have values greater or equal
than ci(pi) (thus m ≥ j).
Now, suppose that A(pi′) ≥l A(pi). By definition of the ordering, this
means that either the first m elements of the vector have the same value in
both A(pi) and A(pi′) or at least one of them has increased its value. Since
the value ci(pi) that was occupying the j-th position has decreased, in both
cases another element of the vector must have increased its value to at least
ci(pi). The only way for player i to make a resource increase its delay is to
actually use it (for the delay functions are non-decreasing), so we have that
in pi′ player i is using a resource with a value at least ci(pi). That contradicts
the fact that ci(pi
′) < ci(pi). Therefore, we have that A(pi′) <l A(pi).
Now we are able to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.0.4. Any weighted NMC game with non-decreasing delay func-
tions has a generalized ordinal potential.
Proof. The function γ that maps each profile pi to the value of A(pi) seen as a
n-digit number in base D+1 (that is, γ(pi) =
∑
0≤j≤nA(pi)j ·(D+1)j), where
D = maxe∈E de(W ) and W =
∑
i∈N wi, is therefore a generalized potential
function.
Corollary 3.0.5 (Banner and Orda, 2006). Any weighted NMC game with
non-decreasing delay functions game has a PNE.
Thanks to the result by Monderer and Shapley that we mentioned in
Theorem 2.3.4, the proof of the previous corollary is slightly simpler than
the one in [Banner and Orda, 2006]. However, note that it is essential for the
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proof of Claim 3.0.3 that the delay functions of the game be non-decreasing;
we have not been able to extend the idea of the proof to games with arbitrary
delay functions.
Finally, let us briefly consider NMC games that are Pareto-efficient, i.e.
where the cost functions are so that all improving movements that a player
may do provoke no harm to the other players. It is easy to see that the
function σ(pi) =
∑
i∈N ci(pi) is a generalized ordinal potential function (but
not an exact potential function) for these games (as well as for the more
general class of Pareto-efficient strategic games).
Proposition 3.0.6. Let Γ = (N, (Pi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N) be a Pareto-efficient game.
Then, σ(pi) =
∑
i∈N ci(pi) is a generalized potential function for Γ.
This is a sufficient condition for the following theorem.
Theorem 3.0.7. Any Pareto-efficient weighted NMC game has a PNE pro-
file.
So far we have proved the existence of pure Nash equilibria profiles for
a number of subclasses of network max-congestion games. In the follow-
ing chapter we will deal with the computational complexity of finding these
equilibria.
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Chapter 4
Computation of Pure Nash
Equilibria
In the previous chapter, we analysed what kind of network max-congestion
games do possess pure Nash equilibrium profiles. We saw that as long as we
enforce the delay functions of the games to be non-decreasing, we can ensure
that all kinds of NMC games, be them single or multi-commodity, weighted
or unweighted, have PNE. In this chapter, we tackle the issue from a more
constructive point of view and study what is the computational complexity
of computing those PNE. First, we study some classes of NMC games with
non-decreasing delay functions for which the computation of a PNE can be
done in polynomial time. Later, we move to some other classes for which we
have not been able to prove that the computation of a PNE belongs to P,
and we show that, at least, it does belong to the class PLS. We also prove
the PLS-completeness of this same problem for a particular class of games.
4.1 Single-commodity Games
For single-commodity games, we were able to design an algorithm that com-
putes PNE profiles for some kind of weighted single-commodity non-decreasing
delay NMC games. The algorithm BDP (for Best Disjoint Path) is essen-
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Algorithm 1: Computation of a PNE (BDP algorithm)
input : A weighted single-com. game
Γ = (N,G, (s, t), (de)e∈E(G), (wi)i∈N) with non-decreasing
delay functions
output: A strategy profile pi for Γ
begin
Let M be a maximal set of (s− t) disjoint paths;
N ′ := N ;
while N ′ 6= ∅ do
i := argmax
i∈N ′
wi;
p := argmin
p∈M
max
e∈p
de(le(pi) + wi);
Allocate player i to path c;
N ′ := N ′ \ {i};
end
tially an adaptation of the round-robin philosophy. It proceeds in two phases.
First, it computes a maximal set M of (s− t) disjoint paths, and then it as-
signs players to paths in M step by step: at each step, the player i with
maximum weight (from the set of players still unassigned) is assigned to the
path p ∈ M that yields him the minimum cost, that is, the path that mini-
mizes the value maxe∈p de(le(pi)+wi), where pi is the (partial) strategy profile
we are constructing.
Before we could find a formal proof of the correctness, we ran some ex-
periments which empirically tried to confirm or refute the hypothesis that
the algorithm actually computed a PNE profile. The experiments consisted
of the following steps:
• We generated random unweighted single-commodity NMC games with
identity delay functions and with a maximum of 500 players and with
a graph of at most 100 nodes.
• We applied the BDP algorithm over the random game.
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• We checked that the obtained strategy profile was indeed a PNE profile.
The randomly generated games were simpler than the weighted NMC
games that we are considering in the section, but this does not invalidate
the utility of the experiment. We ran more than 100.000 times the above-
mentioned steps to find that all computed profiles were PNE profiles. This
clearly supported the idea that, at least for this simpler games, the algo-
rithm could be proved to be correct. Some more details about the process of
generation of random games can be found in Appendix A.
Let us now present a formal analysis of the properties of the profiles
computed by the algorithm.
Lemma 4.1.1. After each iteration of the BDP algorithm, no player already
assigned to some path in the (partial) profile pi has an incentive to change
his strategy for another path from M .
Proof. The claim obviously holds after the first iteration. By induction,
suppose that it also holds for the (partial) profile pik obtained after the k-th
iteration, let i be the player assigned to path p on the iteration k + 1 and
let us consider the profile pik+1 = (pik−i, p) computed after this (k + 1)-th
iteration. By construction, player i is satisfied with his strategy in pik+1. Let
us now suppose that for some player j already assigned to p in pik there is an
incentive to change his strategy to another path p′ ∈ M . This means that
maxe∈p′ de(le(pik)+wj) < maxe∈p de(le(pik)+wi). Since wi ≤ wj and the delay
functions are non-decreasing, maxe∈p′ de(le(pik) + wi) ≤ maxe∈p′ de(le(pik) +
wj), but this implies that maxe∈p′ de(le(pik) + wi) < maxe∈p de(le(pik) + wi),
which contradicts the fact that p has been chosen to minimize this last value.
Thus, no player assigned to p has incentive to change his strategy.
Now, let us suppose that for some player j assigned to a path p′ 6= p ∈M
there is an incentive to change his strategy to another path in M . The cost
induced by paths different than p has clearly remained unchanged from pik to
pik+1 (since we are considering only disjoint paths), while the cost induced by
path p cannot be lower in pik+1 than in pik, for the delay functions are non-
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decreasing. Thus, this contradicts our inductive hypothesis that all players in
pik were satisfied with their path. Hence, all players in pik+1 are satisfied.
For graphs where all the (s − t) paths are disjoint, the set M computed
by the BDP algorithm coincides with the set of all the strategies available to
players. Hence, the computed profile can be immediately seen to be a PNE.
Corollary 4.1.2. For single-commodity NMC games where the graph con-
sists only of a number of (s − t) disjoint paths, the profile computed by the
BDP algorithm is a PNE.
On the other hand, if we consider general graph topologies but we restrict
the delay functions of the edges to be identical, we have that, although there
may be strategies other than the disjoint paths, none of them will yield a
better cost.
Corollary 4.1.3. For single-commodity NMC games where all the delay
functions are identical, the profile computed by the BDP algorithm is a PNE.
Proof. Notice that the profiles pi computed by the algorithm have the prop-
erty that, for any path p ∈ M , all edges e ∈ p have the same congestion
le(pi). Thus, we now have that the delay induced by all edges of p is equal.
Since M is maximal, any (s− t) path p′ shares at least one edge e with some
path p ∈ M , and this edge e induces a delay equal to the delay induced by
the whole path p. Hence, a player choosing p′ would have to assume a cost
at least as large as if he chose p, which (by the previous lemma) is no better
than the cost of the path he has been assigned to in pi.
Given that a maximal set of disjoint paths (even a maximum set, see for
instance [Kleinberg and Tardos, 2006]) can be obtained in polynomial time
and that our algorithm runs also in polynomial time, we can then state the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1.4. Computing a PNE can be done in polynomial time for
both (a)Weighted single-commodity NMC games with non-decreasing delay
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functions where all the (s−t) paths of the graph are disjoint. and (b) Weighted
single-commodity NMC games with identical non-decreasing delay functions.
We have not been able to extend the idea of this algorithm to general
weighted single-commodity games, nor to prove completeness of the problem
for some complexity class harder than FP. The complexity of the problem
for general weighted single-commodity games, thus, remains open, but we
believe this contribution to be interesting enough, both for the importance
of the class of games with identical non-decreasing delay functions and for
the simplicity of the algorithm.
4.2 Multi-commodity Games
We will here study the complexity of the computation of equilibria in multi-
commodity NMC games. The technique of distributing players among a set
of disjoint paths cannot be applied to this kind of games anymore, since edge-
disjoint paths among different commodities may not exist (and even if they
do, a simple distribution of players among paths may not lead to a PNE).
The majority of our attempts to find an algorithm to do this task for general
multi-commodity games have been unsuccessful. So far, we have only been
able to solve the problem for a particular subclass of this games, but this, in
our opinion, should be seen as an important first step.
4.2.1 l-common-edges Games
The particular subclass of games that we just mentioned, which we call l-
common-edges games, is made up of unweighted NMC games with identity
delay functions where the graph of the game has a restricted topology. Let us
first describe the graph topology of these games. Let M = {(si, ti) | i ∈ N}
be the set of the m different commodities of a NMC game (note that m ≤
|N |). A l-common-edges game is a game whose graph has the following
topology:
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• There is a set E∗ of l common or public edges such that for each edge
e ∈ E∗ and each commodity i ∈ M there is exactly one (si-ti) path pei
using e.
• For each commodity i ∈M there are two different sets of (si-ti) paths:
- A set Li of li private paths that are edge-disjoint with respect to
all other paths in the graph.
- A set L′i = {pei | e ∈ E∗} of l public paths that are edge-disjoint
one with respect to the other (exactly one path for every common
edge).
Note that, given this l-common edges topology, the congestion of any path
pei is always equal to the congestion of the edge e ∈ E∗.
We will also use the following notation. For each edge e ∈ E∗, let
Pe =
⋃
i∈M {pei} be the set of m paths using the common edge e. For any
commodity i, we denote by Ni the set of players choosing (si-ti) paths and
let ni = |Ni|. For any subset S ⊆ M , we denote by NS the set of players
that choose paths between the two nodes of any commodity in S and let
nS = |NS|. Let also LS =
⋃
i∈S Li and L
′
S =
⋃
i∈S L
′
i be, respectively, the
sets of all private and public paths of commodities in S, and let lS = |LS|
and l′S = |L′S|. Finally, let kS the quotient nSl+lS .
4.2.2 An Algorithm
We now present an algorithm for the computation of PNE in the previously
described class of games (see Algorithm 2). In the subsequent description, we
will denote by kS the quotient
nS
l+lS
. Given an unweighted multi-commodity
NMC game, the algorithm starts (lines 2-5) by searching a subset of com-
modities which may be able to dominate all the set of common edges, that
is, to be the only commodities whose players use those edges in such a way
that players from other commodities can be satisfied even if they only use
their private paths.
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Algorithm 2: PNE computation in multi-commodity NMC games.
input : An unweight. l-common-edges game Γ = (N,G, ((si, ti))i∈N)
output: A profile pi for the given game
begin1
// Selection of a proper subset of commodities:
foreach t := 1, . . . ,m do2
foreach S ⊆M s.t. |S| = t and while S is not proper do3
if ∀i ∈M \ S
(
bkSc ≥
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1
)
then4
S is a proper subset5
// Distribution of players among paths:
foreach i ∈ S do6
foreach p ∈ Li do7
Allocate bkSc players from Ni to path p8
foreach e ∈ E∗ do9
Allocate bkSc players from NS to the paths in Pe10
foreach i ∈ S do11
foreach p ∈ Li do12
if there remain unallocated players in Ni then13
Allocate one player from Ni to path p14
foreach e ∈ E∗ do15
if there remain unallocated players in NS then16
Allocate one player from NS to a suitable path p ∈ Pe17
Let N ′S be the set of players from NS still not allocated18
while N ′S 6= ∅ do19
Let j be a player from N ′S20
Let i ∈ S be a commodity s.t.21
1) ∃ a path p ∈ Li with only bkSc allocated players, and22
2) ∃ a player j′ ∈ Ni already allocated to a path p′ ∈ L′i23
Allocate player j′ to path p and player j to path p′24
N ′S := N
′
S \ {j}25
foreach i ∈M \ S do26
Allocate players in Ni to paths in Li in a Round-Robin fashion27
end28
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Lemma 4.2.1. After the execution of lines 2-5 of Algorithm 2, the following
statements hold:
i) ∀i ∈M \ S
(
bkSc ≥
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1
)
ii) ∀S ′ ⊆M
(
|S ′| < |S| ⇒ ∃i ∈M \ S ′
(
bkSc <
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1
))
iii) ∀i ∈ S
(
ni
li
≥ kS
)
Proof. The first proposition is exactly the condition in line 4. Notice that
this condition will evaluate to true sooner or later, since it always holds when
S =M . The second proposition is directly implied by the order in which the
algorithm considers the subsets of M .
Finally, let us prove the last proposition. Suppose that there exists a
commodity i ∈ S for which the proposition does not hold, i.e. ni
li
< kS or,
equivalently, ni < kS · li. Thus,
kS\{i} =
nS\{i}
l + lS\{i}
=
nS − ni
l + lS − li >
nS − kS · li
l + lS − li =
nS − ( nSl+lS ) · li
l + lS − li
=
nS(l + lS − li)
(l + lS)(l + lS − li) =
nS
l + lS
= kS
Therefore, it holds that
kS\{i} > kS >
ni
li
≥
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1
Since
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1 is an integer, ⌊kS\{i}⌋ ≥ ⌈nili ⌉− 1. On the other hand, thanks
to the first proposition of the lemma we can state that
∀i′ ∈M \ S
(⌊
kS\{i}
⌋ ≥ bkSc ≥ ⌈ni′
li′
⌉
− 1
)
Combining the two last propositions, we have that
∀i′ ∈M \ (S \ {i})
(⌊
kS\{i}
⌋ ≥ ⌈ni′
li′
⌉
− 1
)
but, since |S \ {i}| < |S|, that contradicts what we have shown in the second
proposition of the lemma. Consequently, the third proposition must hold.
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Once the algorithm has determined which subset S ⊆ M dominates the
set E∗ of common edges, it distributes players among paths in a particular
manner. In the first place (l. 6-25), it distributes all the players from the
commodities in S. The loop in lines 6-8 allocates bkSc players to every path
of every commodity i ∈ S. Since, as we have seen, ni ≥ li ·kS, enough players
exist to allow this allocation. After the execution of the loop, lS ·bkSc players
have been allocated. Thus, there remain at least kS · l unallocated players.
This fact ensures the correct execution of the second loop (lines 9-10), given
that it allocates exactly bkSc · l players to paths in L′S. After the execution of
these loops, every path in LS, as well as every edge in E
∗, have a congestion
of exactly bkSc units. Next (l. 11-14), the algorithm iterates again through
all the private paths of every commodity in S, allocating –when possible–
one more player to each of them. Similarly, the loop of lines 15-17 allocates
to each group of paths Pe (for all e ∈ E∗) at most one more player from NS.
Therefore, after the execution of these two loops every path in LS and every
edge in E∗ have congestion either bkSc or bkSc+ 1.
Let us now analyze the loop of lines 19-25:
Lemma 4.2.2. At each iteration of the loop of lines 19-25 of Algorithm 2,
the following propositions hold:
i) There exists a commodity i ∈ S such that
(a) There exists a path p ∈ Li with only bkSc allocated players, and
(b) There exists a player j′ ∈ Ni already allocated to a path p′ ∈ L′i
ii) Every path in LS and every edge in E
∗ (and thus every path in L′S have
congestion either bkSc or bkSc+ 1
Proof. i) Consider the set S∗ ⊆ S of commodities i ∈ S with at least one
path in Li having congestion bkSc. Let us first see that, at any iteration
of the loop, this set S∗ is not empty. Since we have entered the loop,
there remain some unallocated players in N ′S ⊆ NS. That implies that
all paths in L′S have congestion bkSc + 1. If there were a path in L′S
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with congestion bkSc, then there would be a path with that congestion
in each L′i, i ∈ S, due to the nature of our graph topology. But that
is not possible, otherwise the loop of lines 15-17 would have allocated
to these paths the unallocated players from N ′S. It is then impossible
that all commodities i ∈ S have congestion bkSc + 1, otherwise the
total number of players allocated would be (lS+ l) · (bkSc+1), which is
strictly greater than nS, the actual number of players. Thus, we have
that S∗ contains at least one commodity.
In turn, that fact implies that no player of NS∗ is in N
′
S, the set of
unallocated players; otherwise, the loop of lines 11-14 would have allo-
cated him to one of the paths of his commodity with congestion bkSc.
All the players in N ′S, then, come from commodities in S \S∗ (and that
also proves that S∗ ( S, that is, that S \ S∗ is not empty).
Let us now suppose that all players in NS∗ are allocated to paths in LS∗ .
One one hand, that means that all shared paths in L′S are allocated only
to players in NS\S∗ . Since, by definition of S∗, all paths in LS\S∗ have
congestion bkSc + 1, the number of players in NS\S∗ already allocated
equals (bkSc + 1) · (l + lS\S∗). Furthermore, there is at least one more
(unallocated) player in NS\S∗ , otherwise we would have not entered
the loop. Therefore, the total number of players in NS\S∗ is nS\S∗ ≥
(bkSc + 1) · (l + lS\S∗) + 1 > (bkSc + 1) · (l + lS\S∗), so we have that
nS\S∗
l+lS\S∗
> bkSc+ 1.
On the other hand, that means that the number of players in each
commodity i∗ ∈ S∗ is ni∗ < (bkSc+1) · li∗ . Therefore, ni∗li∗ < bkSc+1 <
nS\S∗
l+lS\S∗
= kS\S∗ , using the previous inequality. In turn, the total number
of players in NS∗ is nS∗ < (bkSc + 1) · lS∗ , so we have that nS∗lS∗ <
(bkSc+ 1) < kS\S∗ , using the same inequality as before. Therefore,
kS =
nS
l + lS
=
nS∗ + nS\S∗
l + lS∗ + lS\S∗
<
nS\S∗
l + lS\S∗
= kS\S∗
which makes use of the general fact that c
d
< a
b
⇒ a+c
b+d
< a
b
.
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Now, we can apply lemma 4.2.1 to state that
∀i ∈M \ S
(
kS\S∗ > kS ≥ bkSc ≥
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1
)
while, as we have just seen, ∀i∗ ∈ S∗
(
kS\S∗ >
ni∗
li∗
>
⌈
ni∗
li∗
⌉)
. Merging
both assertions, we have that
∀i ∈M \ (S \ S∗)
(
kS\S∗ >
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1
)
which implies that
∀i ∈M \ (S \ S∗)
(⌊
kS\S∗
⌋ ≥ ⌈ni
li
⌉
− 1
)
since
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1 is an integer.
This last assertion, however, contradicts the second proposition of lemma 4.2.1.
For that reason, we have to conclude that there exists at least one player
in NS∗ which is allocated to a path in L
′
S, and the proposition is proved.
ii) The second proposition is not difficult to prove, since the algorithm
first reallocates a player from a path with congestion bkSc+1 to a path
with congestion bkSc and then allocates a player to the first path.
At the end of the loop of lines 19-25, then, we have that for any commodity
i ∈ S, any player j ∈ Ni is allocated to a path with congestion at most
bkSc + 1. Since all the other paths available to j are in LS ∪ L′S and thus
have congestion at least bkSc, player j has no incentive to change his strategy.
With respect to the players of commodities in M \ S, the algorithm (l.
26-27) simply allocates them to paths in Li in a Round-Robin fashion. We
then have that, if ni is divisible by li, all paths in Li will have congestion
ni
li
. Thus, for any commodity i ∈M \ S and any player j ∈ Ni, player j will
have no incentive to change his strategy, since all the other paths in Li have
the same congestion ni
li
, whereas all the paths in L′i have an edge in E
∗ with
congestion at least bkSc ≥
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1 = ni
li
− 1 (recall lemmas 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).
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On the other hand, if ni is not divisible by li, all paths in Li will have
congestion either
⌊
ni
li
⌋
or
⌊
ni
li
⌋
+ 1. Thus, for any commodity i ∈M \ S and
any player j ∈ Ni, player j will have no incentive to change his strategy, since
the paths in Li will have congestion at least
⌊
ni
li
⌋
, and –as we have already
seen– the paths in L′i have congestion at least bkSc ≥
⌈
ni
li
⌉
− 1 =
⌊
ni
li
⌋
. As
no player has an incentive to change his strategy, we can conclude that the
profile computed by our algorithm is a PNE. Furthermore, if we consider
that the number of commodities is fixed, the running time of the algorithm
can be proved to be polynomial. Therefore, the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 4.2.3. Let Γ be an unweighted l-common-edges game. Algorithm 2
computes a PNE for Γ; furthermore, if we consider the number of commodi-
ties to be a fixed constant k, the algorithm solves the problem of computing
a PNE for unweighted k-commodities l-common-edges games in polynomial
time.
4.3 Towards PLS
The absence of an exact potential function for NMC games with non de-
creasing delay functions prevents us from being able to prove (in a manner
completely analogous to the way that this can be done for congestion games,
see [Fabrikant et al., 2004]) that the computation of a PNE for general NMC
games is in PLS. However, we will now see that the generalized ordinal poten-
tial function γ introduced in the proof of theorem 3.0.4, along with a special
definition of the neighborhood structure of the search problem, suffice for the
proof of the aforementioned membership in PLS.
Theorem 4.3.1. The problem of computing a PNE for weighted multi-commodity
non-decreasing delay NMC belongs to PLS.
Proof. Consider the search problem of finding a local optimum of γ, where
the set of feasible solutions contains all valid strategy profiles of our game
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and the neighborhood N(pi,Γ) of a solution pi is the set of all profiles pi′ where
exactly one player has changed his strategy for a better one:
N(pi,Γ) = {pi′ ∈ Π | ∃i ∈ N ∃p ∈ Pi pi′ = (pi−i, p) ∧ ci(pi′) < ci(pi)}
Notice that this last condition ci(pi
′) < ci(pi) implies that (i) the neigh-
borhood of pi is empty if and only if pi is a PNE and (ii) For any neighbor
pi′ ∈ N(pi,Γ) of a given profile pi, it holds that γ(pi′) < γ(pi) (by definition of
γ and Theorem 3.0.4). Thus, finding a PNE is equivalent to finding a local
minimum of the function γ with respect to the neighborhood defined above.
This search problem belongs to PLS, since (a) an initial solution can
be produced in polynomial time by assigning to every player an arbitrary
strategy, (b) The cost γ(pi) of any profile pi can be computed in polynomial
time. (c) deciding whether N(pi,Γ) = ∅ (i.e. pi is a local optimum) or, if this
is not the case, computing a strategy profile pi′ ∈ N(pi,Γ) s.t. γ(pi′) < γ(pi)
can be done in polynomial time using a modification of the Dijkstra algorithm
where the shortest path computation is done considering that the length of
an edge e is de(le(pi)) and the length of a path p is maxe∈p de(le(pi)).
Notice that the previous proof can be immediately generalized to the
case of general max-congestion games. We only have to see that, since the
representation of the game explicitly contains the set of actions for each
player, deciding if a given profile is a local optimum with respect to the
neighborhood can be done in polynomial time by computing the cost of all
neighbors of the profile.
Also observe that, as we mentioned before, the neighborhood used in the
proof is not the neighborhood that one may initially think of when consider-
ing the nature of games (see, for instance, [Fabrikant et al., 2004; Nisan et al.,
2007]), where the neighbors of a given profile pi are all profiles pi′ = (pi−i, p)
(for some i ∈ N and p ∈ Pi). Given that max-congestion games are not exact
potential games and that we only have at our disposal a generalized ordinal
potential function, we have to restrict the neighbors to those profiles where
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the deviating player improves his cost in order to get a search problem whose
local optima coincide with the PNE profiles of the game.
Finally, let us say that the requirement of the delay functions being non-
decreasing is essential to the proof of Claim 3.0.3, so the above technique can
not be trivially extended to games with arbitrary delay functions. However,
there is another particular class of games with delay functions that are not
restricted to be non-decreasing which does actually possess a generalized
ordinal potential function. An analogous proof can be used to show that the
problem of computing a PNE for any Pareto-efficient strategic is equivalent
to the PLS problem of finding a local minimum of the function σ that allowed
us to prove theorem 3.0.7) with respect to the neighborhood defined in the
proof of theorem 4.3.1.
Theorem 4.3.2. Computing a PNE for Pareto-efficient strategic games is
in PLS.
Proof. This problem is equivalent to the problem of finding a local minimum
of the function σ with respect to the neighborhood defined in the proof of
theorem 4.3.1.
Corollary 4.3.3. Computing a PNE for Pareto-efficient NMC is in PLS.
The Pareto-efficiency may seem too strong a restriction, i.e. one may
think that the class of NMC games which are Pareto-efficient is a very simple
class and the the previous PLS upper bound is too loose. However, allowing
unrestricted delay functions makes the problem complex to the point that
it can be proved to be PLS-hard: we next prove that the computation of a
PNE for Pareto-efficient weighted parallel links1 NMC games is a PLS-hard
problem. The proof is based on a PLS-reduction from the MAX-CUT problem
with the flip neighborhood, for which finding a local optimum is known to be
PLS-hard [Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis, 1991]. In this problem, we are given an
undirected graph with weights on the edges and we have to find a partition
1A parallel links game is a restricted version of a single-commodity game where all the
edges of the graph are edges between s and t (i.e. the graph is actually a multi-graph).
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of the nodes into two disjoint sets A and B such that the cut of the partition
(i.e. the sum of weights of edges between nodes assigned to different sets)
cannot be increased by changing one single node from A to B or vice versa.
Theorem 4.3.4. The problem of computing a PNE for weighted Pareto-
efficient parallel links NMC games is PLS-complete.
Proof. Let us define WT as the sum of weights of all edges and WA (and
analogously, WB) as the sum of weights of edges with both endpoints in A
(B). Then, the value of the cut is WT − (WA +WB), and maximizing it is
equivalent to minimizing WA +WB, since WT is fixed.
Now, given a MAX-CUT instance, we can define a weighted parallel links
max-congestion game in the following way. There’s one player for every node
of the original graph, and the weight of each player is used as a means of
identifying that player. Thus, the weight wi of player i is a binary number
of length n where the i-th digit is 1 and the rest of the digits are 0. The
graph G of the game is a simple graph with two nodes, s and t, and two
parallel links e1 and e2 from s to t. Finally, the delay function of both edges
is defined as
d(l) =
∑
1≤i<j≤n
s.t. li=lj=1
wi,j +
∑
1≤i<j≤n
s.t. li=lj=0
wi,j
where li is the i-th digit of l and wi,j is the weight of edge (i, j). Intuitively,
player i choosing edge e1 can be thought of as node i being assigned to set
A (equivalently for edge e2 and set B). The delay of both edges is then
WA +WB. Thus, in any PNE the value WA +WB cannot be decreased by
one player moving from one edge to the other, so the partition of nodes of
the MAX-CUT problem induces a maximum cut with respect to the flip
neighborhood. Besides, the game is clearly Pareto-efficient, so the proof is
complete.
Note that the previous reduction implies the PLS-hardness of the com-
putation of a PNE for Pareto-efficient weighted network congestion games
51
4.3. Towards PLS
(since there is no distinction between parallel links NMC games and parallel
links network congestion games) and general Pareto-efficient strategic games.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this final chapter we will quickly summarize the results so far presented
in this thesis. Afterwards, we will point out the main open problems and
suggest some future research lines.
5.1 Summary and Discussion of the Results
We will here discuss, as a recapitulation, about the development of this thesis
and the obtained results and their relevance when compared to the results
obtained in the other papers that deal with the model of max-congestion
games, which were mentioned in Section 2.3.3. Unfortunately for the origi-
nality of the results that we present here, it was not until a medium stage
of our research that we found these other papers, some of whose results sub-
sumed part of ours. The cause of our ignorance, our lack of skill apart, could
be attributed to the fact that two of the mentioned papers were published
once we had already started our research. Also, the novelty of this research
area and the high number of publications provoke, on one hand, a somewhat
misleading lack of uniformity in denominations and notation and, on the
other hand, a difficulty to keep up to date with new publications. A proof
of this can be seen in the fact that each of the three mentioned papers gives
a different name to what we call max-congestion game (Bottleneck routing
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games, Network load games, Routing games on maximum congestion), not to
mention that the results of the three papers are overlapping, which probably
shows that the authors of each of the papers were not aware of the other
publications.
For this reason, we believe that the value of this thesis is also to bee looked
for in the documenting effort, the unification of results mostly written under
different notation paradigms and the clarification of obscure points.
Chronologically, the first model of max-congestion games that we studied
was the simplest one: unweighted and single-commodity network games with
identity delay functions. A preliminary study of the properties of this games
led us to the development of the polynomial-time BDP algorithm and the
analysis of its properties and correctness. The idea behind the algorithm is
quite simple: given that the edges have identity delay functions, the multiples
choices that players have (as many as (s − t) paths are in the graph) can
actually be reduced to a smaller set of disjoint paths. This guarantees some
nice properties which can be exploited in order to obtain an equilibrium
profile just by evenly distributing players among paths. Once we could prove
the correctness of this idea for games with identity functions, we tried to
extend it to the general class of single-commodity games. We could prove that
the algorithm was still correct if we allowed non-decreasing delay functions,
but only as long as we enforce the different edges to have all the same delay
function. This is not a minor restriction; however, we believe that the model
of games where all edges have identical delay functions is still quite broad
and useful. Consider, for instance, that we want to model a situation where
different users of a corporate network are routing their packets solely within
the network. In this case, it seems acceptable to think that all the links in
the network will probably be equal and thus have equal delay functions.
We also managed to prove the correctness of the quite straight-forward
extension of the algorithm to single-commodity games with non-decreasing
delay functions where the graph of the game was made up only of disjoint
paths, but we could not further extend the algorithm to the general case nor
54
5.1. Summary and Discussion of the Results
find another way of dealing with this case.
Later, we tackled the extension of the algorithm to unweighted multi-
commodity games. There was no obvious way of dealing with the fact that the
idea of considering only disjoint paths is not appropriate for multi-commodity
games, since it may be the case that there exist less disjoint paths than
commodities. Thus, we started to consider restricted graph topologies and
ended up designing a rather involved algorithm for games with what we
called l-common-edges graphs (see Section 4.2). This is quite a restrictive
graph topology, for the interactions among players are confined to a set of l
common disjoint edges, but we believe it to be a first step for the study of
these games.
After this first algorithmic approach, we moved on to a more theoretical
approach. We discovered the existence proof in [Banner and Orda, 2006],
which applied to general network max-congestion games, as long as the delay
functions were restricted to be non-decreasing. We reworked, clarified and
slightly simplified this proof by means of some ideas which were present in
[Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. Afterwards we proved that the computation
of a PNE for network max-congestion with non-decreasing delay functions
belongs to the class PLS. Our proof is based in the classical congestion games
proof, but introduces a couple of novelties that overcome the absence of
exact potential functions for our games. Namely, we show that the existence
of a generalized ordinal potential function is sufficient, as long as we use a
particular neighborhood structure, to prove the membership in PLS.
Once this result was accomplished, we tried to prove PLS-hardness. We
found a rather interesting reduction from a well-known PLS-complete prob-
lem, the MAX-CUT problem with the flip neighborhood, to the problem of
computing a PNE in max-congestion games (see 4.3.4). Unfortunately, the
reduction used some delay functions which were not non-decreasing, so the
PLS-hardness could only be proved for games with arbitrary delay functions,
which so far we do not know to belong to PLS. This means that it is un-
likely to find an efficient algorithm to compute PNE profiles for NMC games
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with arbitrary delay functions, but we still do not know if it happens the
same if we enforce the delay functions to be non-decreasing. With the goal
of proving the PLS-completeness of our problem for at least one subclass of
network max-congestion games, we moved on to the consideration of Pareto-
efficient games, an apparently very restricted class of games for which we
had easily showed that the computation of a PNE belongs to PLS. However,
it turned out that our previous PLS-reduction used a Pareto-efficient game,
so the PLS-completeness was proved.
5.2 Novelty of the Results
Let us here discuss the relevance of our results. As we have already said,
the existence of PNE for general network max-congestion games with non-
decreasing delay functions had already been proved in [Banner and Orda,
2006]. However, we think that our proof, which uses part of theirs, is slightly
clearer. It also uses a previous result of the field that the authors of the paper
seem to ignore, and we believe this to be interesting, especially considering
the high degree of fragmentation of this research field.
With respect to the constructive part of the thesis, that is, the two al-
gorithms that we have developed to compute pure Nash equilibria, they are
also mainly original results. [Caragiannis et al., 2005] states that there is
a PTAS1 that computes a strategy profile with optimum social cost2 for
weighted single-commodity NMC games with identical delay functions on
the links. This means that if we are just interested in the complexity of a
PNE without taking into account its social cost, this PTAS can compute it in
1A PTAS (for Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme) is an approximation algorithm
that, given an instance of an optimization problem and a value ε > 0, outputs a solution of
the instance with cost at most (1+ε) times worse than the optimal cost. The computation
time of the PTAS is polynomial with respect to the size of the instance, but not necessarily
with respect to the value 1/ε. Indeed, if it is also polynomial with respect to this value,
it is called a FPTAS (Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme)
2The social cost of a profile is some kind of global measure of its cost.
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polynomial time. However, the mentioned paper does not provide any proof
of their statement, so we still believe that our BDP algorithm is interesting
for its conceptual clarity. On the other hand, we do not know any attempt
to algorithmically solve the problem in the case of multi-commodity NMC
games, so our second algorithm, however valid only for a restricted class of
games, is an original contribution.
Finally, concerning all our results about membership in PLS and PLS-
completeness, as far as we know they are all completely original, since no
other paper relates NMC games to the PLS class.
5.3 Future Research
Let us here provide some insight on possible future lines of research which
have came up during the development of the thesis.
• First, it would be very interesting to settle the computational complex-
ity of PNE computation for weighted single-commodity NMC games
with non-decreasing delay functions and no other restriction, either
through a novel algorithmic approach or through a PLS-reduction.
• Another major result would be the analog for multi-commodity games,
i.e. to determine if general NMC games with non-decreasing functions
(for which we only know that belong to PLS) are PLS-complete or not.
• Another possibility would be to consider the so-called splittable games,
that is weighted games where the players can route their weight through
different paths, and see to which extent our results apply to this model
• Other interesting problems related to this model which we have not
dealt with here include a number of decisional problems such as the
following: What is the complexity of what is known as nashifying a
given strategy profile, that is, transforming a given profile into an equi-
librium profile without increasing the cost paid by any player? How
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many selfish movements do we need from one given strategy profile to
reach a situation of equilibrium or, in other words, how far from the
equilibrium is a given situation? It would be very interesting if we
could solve any of them, since this would give us more insight into the
model.
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Appendix A
Experimentation
In this appendix we present the algorithms that we used for the generation of
random graphs and random NMC games. These algorithms have been used
to experiment with our BDP algorithm, as we mentioned in Section 4.1. The
algorithms were implemented in C++ with the aid of the Boost libraries. We
will here just describe the design of the algorithms.
First, Figure A.1 shows the algorithm used to randomly generate acyclic
graphs. The algorithm takes as input an integer n nodes which determines
the number of nodes of the generated graph and a real number pedge which
determines the probability that two given nodes of the graph have an edge
between them. The graph generation is based on the well-known fact that
every directed acyclic graph has at least one topological ordering. Our algo-
rithm follows then the next procedure: it numbers the nodes of the graph,
puts them in order and, for every pair v1 and v2 such that v1 < v2 in the
ordering, it builds a directed edge (v1, v2) with probability pedge. This way
the graph is guaranteed not to have cycles.
Second, Figure A.2 shows the algorithm used to randomly generate the
unweighted NMC games with identity delay functions. This algorithm takes
as its input a pair of integer numbers max nodes i max players which deter-
mine the maximum number of nodes in the graph and players in the game,
respectively. The functioning of the algorithm is next described. First, it
66
Algorithm DAGGeneration
input : A positive integer number n nodes
input : A positive real number pedge ∈ [0, 1]
output: A directed acyclic graph G
begin1
G := emptyGraph(n nodes)2
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n nodes} do3
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n nodes} do4
if randomRealNumber(0,1) < pedge then5
G := addEdge(G, i, j)6
return G7
end8
Figure A.1: Directed acyclic graph generation.
randomly chooses a number n nodes ≤ max nodes of nodes and a number
n < max players of players. Second, it generates a random directed acyclic
graph and chooses randomly the pair of origin and destination nodes (s, t)
of all players. If there is at least one (s − t) path, then the generated game
is returned. Otherwise, the process goes back to the point where the graph
is generated.
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Algorithm GameGeneration
input : A positive integer number max nodes
input : A positive integer number max players
output: An unweighted single-commodity NMC game with identity
delay functions Γ = (N,G, (s, t), (id)e∈E(G))
begin1
n nodes := randomIntegerNumber(3, max nodes)2
n := randomIntegerNumber(2, max players)3
p := randomRealNumber(0,1)4
graph ok := fals5
do6
G := DAGGeneration(n nodes, p)7
if checkConnectivity(G, 0, n nodes− 1) then8
graph ok := True9
while ¬graph ok10
Γ := createGame(n, G, (0, n nodes− 1), (id)e∈E(G)))11
return Γ12
end13
Figure A.2: Generation of an unweighted single-commodity NMC game with
identity delay functions.
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